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For industria countries in the post-war period, I 3 price leve c. 2 and the money stock have displayed little tendency to revert to given growth paths. ' Indeed, this stylized fact is frequently referred to by monetarist critics of central banks, who point out that periods of temporarily high or low money growth, rather than being subsequently reversed, typically alter the level of the money stock and prices permanently.
Why should such a money supply rule be optimal from the standpoint of central banks and consequently be widely observed? This paper sees the answer in the interaction of price level and nominal interest rate smoothing policies commonly practiced by the world's central banks. Given their responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization, central banks regard price level instability as costly. A s custodians of the financial system, central banks cushion nominal interest rates against economic shocks. The paper analyzes a central bank seeking to smooth price level and nominal interest rate movements occasioned by transitory disturbances to money demand, aggregate supply, and the real interest rate. The tension that arises between these objectives induces non-trend-stationary stochastic processes for the price level and the money stock, which is the modern time-series characterization of the previously mentioned stylized fact. Basically, it is desirable for the central bank to regard past money growth, in part, as
bygones" so that the mo&y stock and the price level wander over time without any tendency to return to given growth paths.
. 1 Using formal statistical procedures, in a sample of industrialized countries in the post-war period Wasserfallen [19851 cannot, in general, reject the hypothesis that monthly consumer price level and M1 money stock data have no tendency to revert to given growth paths.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 11, a simple rational expectations macromodel is laid out and a class of policy rules discussed which contains both trend-stationary and non-trendstationary processes. Central bank preferences for price level and interest rate smoothing are motivated in Section 111. In Section IV, the model is solved assuming that the central bank pursues price level smoothing objectives alone. Section V discusses monetary policy with interest rate smoothing.
Issues of definition and mechanics are explored in V-1. Section V-2 demon strates the "optimality" of a non-trend-stationary money supply rule with interest rate smoothing. Other implications of interest rate smoothing are discussed in Section VI. A brief summary concludes the paper. The money market equilibrium condition closes the model:
THE MACROMODEL
Expectations are assumed to be formed rationally. For the monetary authority, expectations are conditioned on information set I t = {rt' rt-l'"', and Yt-l, Y~-~,...). Individual information mt, mt-l,...; Pt-13 P~-~*...; sets include observations on current local prices and incomes as well.
However, given the model specification, this individual information advantage
The system of equations (1) through (5) determines pt, rt, mt, and y t each period as functions of q t' u t Z v t +a 3 w t' m t-1 -E m t-2 t-1' m t-1' and the -parameters ao, al, a2, a3, y. h, el, and e2. Quasi solution functions or generating processes for pt, rt, mt, and yt are:
Note that since the money demand level-specified disturbance is transitory, aggregate real money balances are trend-stationary. This implies that the price level is trend-stationary if and only if the nominal money stock is.
CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
The choice of policy parameters el and 0 2 is determined by central bank preferences for price level and interest rate smoothing. Central banks prefer smooth price level movements in two senses. As described in equation Central banks smooth nominal interest rates to maintain "orderly money markets." Interest rate smoothing minimizes financial market stress due to interest rate prediction errors and associated surprise wealth redistributions. As custodians of the financial system, central banks prefer smooth interest rates to minimize unexpected asset price movements that raise the risk of bankruptcies and banking crises.
In this paper, absence of q and u serial correlation and preference for minimal expected inflation variability make it optimal for the central bank to generate serially uncorrelated expected inflation and nominal interest rates. That is why the IMA(1,l) restriction on the money supply rule is optimal. It follows for the nominal interest rate that forecast error variance is equivalent to unconditional variance, so a nominal interest rate smoothing objective is equivalent to an objective for Var [r -a 1. 
IV. MONETARY POLICY WITH PRICE LEVEL SMOOTHING OBJECTIVES ALONE
In order to provide a benchmark against which to judge the effects of interest rate smoothing, this section characterizes monetary policy with price level smoothing objectives alone. In this case, 9 1 and 9 2 are chosen to minimize price level forecast error variance, Var[pt -tE1ptl, and the variance of expected inflation, Var [Fpt+l-p , ] .
Using equation (6), the price level forecast error can be written:
The value of A that minimizes the price level forecast error variance is: 
The value of B that minimizes the variance of expected inflation is:
The values of e1 and e2 that satisfy conditions (11) and (13) are:
The value e? represents the optimal contemporaneous money stock response to a nominal interest rate innovation. In Poole's [1970] termi3Second-order conditions are satisfied throughout the paper, nology, a zero 8* 1 is a pure money stock policy. Poole's f 0, then the optimal rule is not trend-stationary. These features characterize the optimal rule regardless of the relative sizes of a, 6, and y.
Here is an answer to the question posed in the introduction. The tension between price level and interest rate smoothing does, in fact, induce non-trend-stationary processes for the money stock and the price level. Why? -Notice that A = A*, so price level forecast error variance continues to be minimized with interest rate smoothing. Basically, it is optimal for central banks to make the expected future money stock and price level respond to current interest rate innovations in order to generate expected inflation and deflation necessary to smooth interest rates without creating price level surprises.
VI. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
V I -1 .
Base Drift
During recent years, when the Federal Reserve has targeted money growth it has appeared to accept "base drift" in the level of the money stock when moving from one targeting period to the next. That is, the Federal Reserve has not adjusted its money growth targets to offset money stock innovations as required to hold the money stock to a predetermined trend target path.5 The analysis in this paper suggests that the non-trend-stationary money stock behavior may result from tension between price level smoothing and interest rate smoothing objectives that the Federal Reserve simultaneously tries to pursue.
VI-2. Inappropriate Detrending
If, as argued in this paper, non-trend-stationary price level and money stock generating processes result from typical central bank preferences, the presumption in doing empirical work should be that detrended price level and money stock data are not trend-stationary. A money supply rule making the detrended money stock a function of trend-stationary variables measuring the cyclical state of the economy would be inappropriate, since it forces the non-trend-stationary money stock to be explained by a trend-stationary generating process. 6 5Broaddus and Goodfriend 119841 document and analyze base drift in detail. Base drift is also discussed in Council of Economic Advisers [1985] , pp. 53-4.
6Nelson and Plosser [ 19821 discuss consequences of misspecification that arise from inappropriate detrending and check for trend-stationarity of some macroeconomic time-series. They also present evidence of non-trend stationarity in U.S. money stock and price level data.
VI-3. Price Level Forecast Error Variance as the Horizon Recedes
Price level forecast error variance cannot be minimized at all horizons in the presence of nominal interest rate smoothing. Consider equation (18) below, which is derived from (6) and (8):
With e 2 t 1, price level forecast error variance rises as the forecast horizon lengthens. With e2 = 1, the forecast error variances are equal for all horizons. However, they are minimized only if el = 0* 1 as given in (14), which is inconsistent with IB*( > IBI as required for interest rate smoothing.
One-period-ahead price level forecast error variance can be minimized with interest rate smoothing, but only if the price level is made non-trendstationary. In that case, the greater the perceived relative costliness of interest rate variability, i.e., 2 in (15) (18) below, which is derived from (6) and (8) (l-e2) . . is not sufficient to perfectly buffer the price level and output against money demand shocks (which are contained in ut). It is necessary that the money supply rule also be trend-stationary, i.e., e2 = 1. However, a peg plus trend stationarity does not minimize price level forecast error or the variance of output, since e2 ,. > 1. In other words, it is inefficient stabilization policy to use a peg to buffer output against money demand shocks. In further contrast to conventional thinking in a static context, the money supply is not entirely demand determined under a peg. It depends on the e 2 money supply rule parameter 1 and on other restrictions of the money supply rule.
VII. SUMMARY
Historically, central banks have utilized monetary policy to stabilize both the financial markets and the macroeconomy. To these ends, they have pursued nominal interest rate and price level smoothing policies respectively. This paper has highlighted tension inherent in pursuing these objectives that induces non-trend-stationary processes for the money stock and the price level. The analysis, thereby, contributes to our understanding of the money stock and price level drift that has characterized the post-war era. It also points out that interest rate smoothing must increase both the price level forecast error variance at some horizon and the variability of expected inflation. So interest rate smoothing tends to create macroeconomic instability. In addition, interest rate smoothing and associated non-trendstationary price level policies have implications, outlined in the paper, for macroeconomic time-series analysis, the distribution of prospective real returns on long-term fixed-rate nominally denominated loans, and the operating characteristics of interest rate pegs. The paper has, however, merely identified a constraint across central bank price level and interest rate smoothing objectives. It remains for future research to investigate such issues as the mix of smoothing behavior that is socially optimal.
'See Dotsey and King 119831 and McCallum 119861 for more on interest rate pegs.
